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Advances in computational optimization allow for the organization of large combinatorial markets. We
aim for allocations and competitive equilibrium prices, i.e. outcomes that are in the core. The research
is motivated by the design of environmental markets, but similar problems appear in energy and logistics
markets or in the allocation of airport time slots. Budget constraints are an important concern in many of
these markets. While the allocation problem in combinatorial exchanges is already NP -hard with payoff-
maximizing bidders, we find that the allocation and pricing problem becomes even Σp2-hard if buyers are
financially constrained. We introduce mixed integer bilevel linear programs (MIBLP) to compute core prices,
and propose pricing functions based on the least core if the core is empty. We also discuss restricted but
simpler cases and effective computational techniques for the problem. In numerical experiments we show
that in spite of the computational hardness of these problems, we can hope to solve practical problem sizes,
in particular if we restrict the size of the coalitions considered in the core computations.
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1. Introduction
Policy-makers but also managers in the private sector have increasingly adopted market mecha-
nisms as a tool to allocate or reallocate scarce resources. These markets need designing and they
typically have the following characteristics: (1) there are multiple heterogeneous and indivisible
objects, and (2) market participants have complex preferences (objects might be substitutes or
complements), allocation constraints and buyers often have budget constraints. We refer to such
markets where the underlying allocation problem is a non-convex optimization problem as non-
convex markets.
Single-sided combinatorial auctions are one example, and there has been substantial interest in
such mechanisms in the past decade. Combinatorial auctions allow bidders to specify package bids,
i.e. a price is defined for a subset of the items for auction. The price is only valid for the entire
package and the package is indivisible. Moreover, the bidder might have no value for any of these
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items if he cannot obtain the whole package. For example, in a combinatorial auction, a bidder
might want to buy 10 units of item x and 20 units of item y for a package price of $100, which might
be more than what he is willing to pay for the items x and y individually. Combinatorial auctions
have found widespread application for the sale of spectrum licences (Bichler and Goeree 2017),
in truck-load transportation (Caplice and Sheffi 2006), for tendering bus routes (Cantillon and
Pesendorfer 2006), or in industrial procurement (Bichler et al. 2006). In addition to the impact on
practice, research on combinatorial auctions has resulted in a significant extension of the theoretical
literature on markets.
Unfortunately, the theory of combinatorial exchanges with multiple buyers and sellers is much
less well developed. A combinatorial exchange allows participants on both sides to submit bids
on packages of indivisible objects. Such types of markets have significant potential for the pri-
vate and the public sector. Examples include the allocation of airport time-slots (Pellegrini et al.
2012, Ball et al. 2017), catch-shares for fishery management (Innes et al. 2014), day-ahead energy
markets (Martin et al. 2014), emission-trading (Sadegheih 2011), port capacity (Strandenes and
Wolfstetter 2005), supply chain co-ordination (Fan et al. 2003, Guo et al. 2012, Walsh et al. 2000),
transportation (Schwind et al. 2009), and native vegetation offsets (Nemes et al. 2008). All these
examples require bids on packages and they typically involve multiple buyers and sellers. Let us
briefly highlight two of these examples in more detail to motivate this research.
1.1. Exchanges for Fishery Access Rights
We will first introduce a concrete example of a combinatorial exchange for fishery access rights
that has started this research. Catch share systems have been shown to be effective tools to combat
overfishing (Birkenbach et al. 2017), one of the prime environmental concerns these days. Yet,
the allocation of catch shares has always been a challenging policy problem (Rosenberg 2017,
Lynham 2014). There is an active discussion about market-based solutions for the allocation and
re-allocation of catch shares (Marszalec 2017, Kominers et al. 2017). Unfortunately, the design of
such markets is challenging as complex constraints need to be considered in practice.
The recent share trading market in New South Wales (NSW) facilitated the reallocation of catch
shares and it is an example for a large-scale combinatorial exchange.1 The market consisted of
several regions, and in each region a number of different types of fishing access rights (aka. share
classes) exist. Shares describe the permission to catch a certain type and quantity of fish in a
particular region, and each of the 100 share classes consists of a number of shares describing units
of effort, such as the number of hooks allowed for line-fishing, the number of nets for net-fishing,
etc. These shares were distributed evenly among fishers already in the 90s, but they were only
1 https://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/fishing/commercial/reform/historical-docs/adjustment-subsidy-program
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effectuated in 2017. After this decision, there was a large percentage of the around 1000 fishers who
caught much less than what was allowed, while others needed additional shares. Bilateral bargaining
among fishers turned out to be difficult, due to the large number of geographically-dispersed fishers
and because of synergistic values among the shares. For example, fishers who wanted to exit the
market did not want to be left with subsets of their endowment. They typically wanted to sell all
their shares or nothing. Also, buyers wanted to specify specific minimum and maximum quantities
of shares to make fishing in a particular region viable. Therefore, package bidding was imperative
to facilitate the exchange. These requirements led to a large-scale combinatorial exchange with
more than 600 fishers participating and exchanging catch shares.
1.2. Exchanges for Airport Time Slots
Combinatorial auctions and exchanges have long been proposed as a market mechanisms for the
allocation of airport time slots (Rassenti et al. 1982, Castelli et al. 2011, Pellegrini et al. 2012, Ball
et al. 2017). Package bids are essential in this domain: An takeoff slot at a flight originating airport
is only valuable with a landing slot at the flight destination airport.
Although markets for airport time slots have not yet been implemented, there is an increasing
pressure to do so. The growth in air traffic in the past decades has made airport capacity a
very scarce resource. Actually, the lack of airport capacity is nowadays a major constraint for
the development of air traffic because building of new runways is strongly limited due to cost,
environmental impact, land availability, or political reasons. Ball et al. (2017) argue that nowadays
there is a strong case for the use of market mechanisms, but these mechanisms need to consider
all relevant constraints to be accepted in practice.
1.3. Budget Constraints
In both of these markets, one can expect that at least some of the buyers are financially con-
strained. For example, we experienced that buyers had significant net present values for shares in
the exchange for long-term fishery access rights, but they often were financially constrained. In
theory, one might assume efficient financial markets such that fishers could raise enough funding,
but this is unrealistic to assume in practice. Similarly, one can assume that small airlines have
budget constraints such that they are not able to purchase landing rights for which they would have
a high net present value. Ignoring such financial constraints leads to depressed bidding as buyers
can only express budget-capped valuations if they want to avoid a loss. Indeed, some markets elicit
both, valuations and budgets that must not be exceeded (Nisan et al. 2009), in order to allow
bidders to adequately express their preferences and constraints.
The importance of budget constraints in practice has led to significant research in mechanism
design. Unfortunately, it was shown that we cannot hope for incentive-compatible mechanisms
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in the presence of budget constraints in multi-object auctions with private budget constraints
(Dobzinski et al. 2008). Incentive-compatibility might be too much to ask for and less of a con-
cern in large markets such as the ones introduced above where participants often have very little
information about the preferences of others and strategic manipulation is challenging to say the
least. However, even if strategic manipulation is less of a concern, a designer might be interested
in stable outcomes, where no participant would want to deviate.
Stability is often seen as a first-order goal in market design (Roth 2002). The core is the most
well-known notion of stability in game theory and it is natural to ask for core-stable outcomes of a
market. Such an outcome requires that there cannot be any coalition of participants to have incen-
tives to deviate. It was shown that core-stability coincides with the notion of competitive equilibria
in markets with payoff-maximizing bidders and that the core might be empty in a combinatorial
exchange (Bikhchandani and Ostroy 2002). Unfortunately, it turns out that the presence of budget
constraints makes the computation of core-stable outcomes a much harder computational problem.
The problem actually becomes Σp2-hard, which is interesting as not many practical problems fall
into this complexity class. In this paper, we analyze the problem theoretically and suggest algorith-
mic approaches to compute stable outcomes. Experiments should illustrate that such approaches
allow us to solve surprisingly large problem sizes in practice.
1.4. Related Literature
Let us first provide a brief survey of the relevant literature in computer science, economics, and
operations research. Mechanism design was successfully applied for the design of one-sided auc-
tions. The traditional mechanism design literature assumes preferences where bidders have inde-
pendent and private valuations and quasilinear utility functions, i.e. participants are pure payoff-
maximisers. The literature imposes budget-balance, individual rationality, incentive-compatibility,
and efficiency (i.e. welfare maximization) as primary design goals and models games with incom-
plete information. The fact that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is dominant-strategy
incentive compatible is remarkable given basic impossibility results in social choice theory (Gibbard
1973, Satterthwaite 1975). Unfortunately, incentive-compatibility is conflicting with other design
desiderata. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have already proven that there is no market mech-
anism which allows the achieving of all four design desiderata mentioned above. For single-sided
auctions, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism satisfies the four design desiderata but, in
environments with multiple buyers and sellers, the VCG mechanism is not budget-balanced and
the auctioneer might make a substantial loss. Budget-balance is almost always a hard constraint.
A few authors have proposed pricing rules for combinatorial exchanges. Parkes et al. (2001)
suggests a threshold scheme, which gives surplus to agents with payments further than a certain
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threshold value from their Vickrey payments. Lubin et al. (2008) suggest a tree-based bidding
language as well as simple linear prices in an iterative combinatorial exchange design. We add to
this literature, but aim for payments that yield core stability in our paper.
Note that payoff-maximization in the form of a quasi-linear utility function is also an impor-
tant assumption for the VCG mechanism to be strategy-proof, i.e. dominant-strategy incentive-
compatible. If bidders have private budget constraints, as we assume in this article, quasi-linearity
is violated and incentive-compatible auction mechanisms do not exist anymore for multi-object
markets (Dobzinski et al. 2008, Fadaei and Bichler 2017). There has been recent progress on approx-
imation mechanisms for two-sided combinatorial auctions (Colini-Baldeschi et al. 2016), but this
work does not focus on budget constraints or the core as a design goal. Overall, the mechanism
design literature shows that those environments which allow for incentive-compatible mechanisms
are quite limited.
Strategic manipulation is less of a concern in large markets such as the market for fishery access
rights. Already, Roberts and Postlewaite (1976) showed that in large markets the ability of an
individual player to influence the market is minimal, so agents should behave as price-taking agents.
In addition, in a combinatorial exchange bidders can submit bids on an exponential set of packages
and neither the type nor the number of bidders participating is known in advance, which makes
strategic manipulation much more challenging.
The complete-information analysis has been the standard approach in general equilibrium theory,
and it is natural to first understand efficiency and payments of a market in a complete-information
model with price-takers. Stability in the form of competitive equilibria and efficiency are the central
design goals in general equilibrium theory. The celebrated Arrow–Debreu model suggests that,
under certain assumptions such as divisible objects, convex preferences, and demand independence
there must be a set of anonymous and linear (i.e. item) prices such that aggregate supplies will
equal aggregate demands for every commodity in the economy (Arrow and Debreu 1954).
Unfortunately, also more recent literature on general equilibrium theory is restricted to markets
with divisible goods and the results do not carry over to combinatorial markets (O’Neill et al. 2005).
However, stability and efficiency are important design desiderata for combinatorial exchanges. The
core is probably the most important solution concept for coalitional games (Aumann 2006). There
has been limited literature on the equivalence of the core and competitive equilibria in combina-
torial exchanges (Bikhchandani and Ostroy 2002, Bichler and Waldherr 2017). This literature is
rooted in linear programming and duality theory. However, it assumes bidders with pure quasi-
linear utility functions and does not allow for budget constraints. For the design of real-world
markets, it is important to consider such financial constraints as well, which is what we do in
this paper. Unfortunately, budget constraints have substantial impact on allocation and payment
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functions of a mechanism as we show, because these two problems are not separable anymore. On a
more general level, Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen (2015) highlight the tight connection between
pricing, algorithms, and optimization and our work contributes to this line of research.
1.5. Contributions
We aim for welfare maximization subject to budget constraints and core-constraints in large non-
convex markets. The allocation problem in a combinatorial exchange is already NP -hard. Not many
practical problems fall in higher classes of the polynomial hierarchy. However, our computational
complexity analysis actually yields that in the presence of budget-constrained buyers the allocation
and pricing problem becomes Σp2-hard. This is important to show formally, and requires an elaborate
reduction from the canonical Σp2-hard problem QSAT2.
Mixed integer bilevel linear programs (MIBLPs) allow us to model such problems. While bilevel
programming has been a topic in the operations research literature for many years, algorithms to
solve MIBLPs have only seen progress in the recent years. This provides us with an opportunity to
further develop algorithmic approaches for MIBLPs in a practically relevant domain. As the core
can sometimes be empty, we also propose pricing functions based on the least core. We introduce
effective cuts to reduce the number of coalitions that need to be considered, as well as decomposition
approaches that allow us to reduce the size of the problem considerably in practice. In addition,
we also show restricted cases that reduce the computational complexity to the class of NP-hard
optimization problems.
In numerical experiments we show that in spite of the computational hardness of these problems,
we can solve practical problem sizes, in particular if we restrict the size of the coalitions considered
in the core computations. Such restrictions keep the problem tractable for realistic problem sizes
and might provide a sufficient level of stability for practical applications. Replicability of experi-
mental results is an important concern and, therefore, we use the CATS test suite (Leyton-Brown
et al. 2000), which provides a widely used instance generator for the airport time-slot allocation
problem discussed earlier.
2. Model and Preliminaries
We first introduce a model without budget constraints based on Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002)
and Bichler and Waldherr (2017). The papers show equivalence of the core and competitive equi-
libria in a combinatorial exchange by drawing on specific linear programming formulations. This
will be our starting point for the analysis of budget constrained buyers.
There is a finite set of bidders N , consisting of buyers i ∈ I and sellers j ∈ J with I ∪ J = N
and I ∩ J = ∅, as well as a finite set of indivisible objects or items, K. Each buyer i ∈ I has a
non-negative valuation for each set of objects S ⊆K denoted vi(S)∈R≥0 with vi(∅) = 0.
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Sellers also have valuations or reservation prices for packages Z ⊆K with vi(Z) ∈ R≥0. Buyers
and sellers have free disposal. Every package is priced and each buyer i ∈ I pays the price pi(S)
for the bundle S he receives, and each seller j ∈ J receives the payment pj(Z) for the bundle Z he
supplies. The vectors Pi = (pi(S))i,S and Pj = (pj(Z))j,Z describe the non-linear prices of buyers
and sellers. In our initial analysis the preferences are quasi-linear, i.e. the payoff of the buyer is
pii = vi(S)−pi(S) and that of the seller is pij = pj(Z)−vj(Z). Later we will add budget constraints.
The problem of finding an efficient assignment maximizing gains from trade among buyers and
sellers can be formulated as a linear program as follows: We use binary variables xi(S) to describe
whether package S is assigned to bidder i and yj(Z) to describe whether package Z is supplied
by seller j. The vectors X = (xi(S))i,S and Y = (yj(Z))j,Z describe the allocations of buyers and
sellers. The model enumerates all possible allocations similar to the single-seller model in de Vries
et al. (2007). The set of all possible object assignments is denoted as Γ, a specific assignment
as (X,Y ) ∈ Γ. For each possible allocation, we have a binary variable δX,Y , which is one if an
allocation is selected and zero otherwise. The model allows for a very natural interpretation of the
dual variable as prices. The dual variables of P are written in brackets.
wP = max
∑
i∈I
∑
S⊆K vi(S)xi(S)−
∑
j∈J
∑
Z⊆K vj(Z)yj(Z)
s.t. xi(S)−
∑
x:xi=S
δX,Y = 0 ∀i∈ I,∀S ⊆K (pi(S))
−yj(Z) +
∑
y:yj=Z
δX,Y = 0 ∀j ∈ J,∀Z ⊆K (pj(Z))∑
S⊆K xi(S)≤ 1 ∀i∈ I (pii)∑
Z⊆K yj(Z)≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J (pij)∑
(X,Y )∈Γ δX,Y = 1 (pia)
0≤ xi(S) ∀S ⊆K,∀i∈ I
0≤ yj(Z) ∀S ⊆K,∀j ∈ J
0≤ δX,Y ∀(X,Y )∈ Γ
(P)
The formulation P introduces a variable δ(X,Y ) for each possible allocation, making the linear
program large but integral. An LP solver selects one vertex with δ(X,Y ) = 1, such that we always
get integer allocations xi(S) and yj(Z) of P (Bichler and Waldherr 2017). At least one of these
allocations maximizes the gains from trade, i.e. welfare in the economy.
With a single seller, the problem is equivalent to the winner determination problem in combina-
torial auctions, which is already known to be NP -hard (Lehmann et al. 2006).2 Note that there are
more effective formulations as binary program, that we will use in Section 3.2, where we discuss
a bilevel program to compute core payments in the presence of financially constrained bidders.
However, model P nicely shows core payments can be computed without budget constraints.
The core-prices resulting from the dual variables of P are non-linear and personalized. It is
straightforward to show that linear prices are impossible if bidders have complementary valuations
(Kelso and Crawford 1982). We can now formulate the dual D of P.
2 Note that even though the problem is NP -hard, there are algorithms that run in polynomial time in the size of the
input if the number of bids is very large compared to the number of items (Lehmann et al. 2006).
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min
∑
i∈I pii +
∑
j∈J pij +pia
s.t. pii ≥ vi(S)− pi(S) ∀i∈ I,∀S ⊆K (xi(S))
pij ≥ pj(Z)− vj(Z) ∀j ∈ J,∀Z ⊆K (yj(S))∑
yj(Z)∈Y pj(Z)−
∑
xi(S)∈X pi(S) +pia ≥ 0 ∀(X,Y )∈ Γ (δX,Y )
pii, pij, pi(S), pj(Z)≥ 0 ∀S,Z ⊆K,
∀i∈ I,∀j ∈ J
pia ∈R
(D)
Bichler and Waldherr (2017) show that if pia = 0, an optimal solution of D lies in the core of the
auction.
Definition 1. Let Πi = (pii)∈R|I|≥0 and Πj = (pij)∈R|J|≥0 be the payoff vectors of the buyers and
sellers in the auction. Then (Πi,Πj) is in the core of the game E , denoted (Πi,Πj)∈ core(E), if∑
i∈I pii +
∑
j∈J pij = V (N) core efficiency∑
i∈C pii +
∑
j∈C pij ≥ V (C) ∀C ⊂N = I ∪J core rationality
More importantly, if the core of the auction is non-empty, then the set of optimal solutions of
D with pia = 0 coincides with the core. Since the dual can be solved via a linear program, once can
determine in polynomial-time, whether the core is empty or not.
The presence of budget constraints Bi of the buyers i ∈ I violates quasi-linearity and, for the
markets that we analyze, the budget constraints of buyers cannot be ignored. Quasi-linear utility
functions describe an environment with transferable utility. If we have budget constraints, only
parts of the utility of the buyer up to the budget is indeed transferable.
3. Budget Constraints
In what follows, we aim for welfare maximization subject to budget constraints and core-constraints
in large non-convex markets. In other words, we want to compute allocations that maximize welfare,
but are stable considering valuations and budgets of bidders.
3.1. Complexity Analysis
First, observe that core constraints might restrict the welfare gains in a combinatorial exchange as
the following example shows.
Example 1. Suppose there are two buyers, b1 and b2, having a value of $10 and $9 for a good,
resp. In addition, buyer b1 has a budget constraint of $1 and cannot spend more money. There
are also sellers S1 and S2 with reserve prices of $0 and $4. The welfare-maximising allocation is
to match b1 and S1 at a price of $1, and b2 and S2 at a price somewhere between $9 and $4,
which yields $15 gains from trade. However, this efficient allocation is not stable, because S1 could
approach b2 and they could agree to deviate at a price of less than $4 and more than $1, which is
profitable for both of them. Matching buyer S1 to b2 is stable, but the gains from trade are only
$9, as compared to the welfare maximizing allocation with gains from trade of $15.
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The example simply illustrates that budget constraints can reduce the gains from trade. Provid-
ing valuations and budget constraints on a market is not unusual. For example, in Google’s auction
for TV ads buyers provided both (Nisan et al. 2009).
From Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) we know that the core of a combinatorial exchange can
be empty even without budget constraints. But even if the core is non-empty without budget
constraints, it can be empty if such constraints are added.
Theorem 1. A budget-constrained combinatorial exchange instance may have an empty core,
even if the core is non-empty when budgets are ignored.
Proof: Consider a case with two sellers, S1 offering item A and S2 offering item B and two
buyers with the following valuations and budgets:
Table 1 Example
{A} {B} {A,B} Budget
Buyer b1 0 0 10 3
Buyer b2 4 4 4 2
Without budget constraints, buyer b1 can pay a price of 4 for each of the items, resulting in a
core outcome. However, if we consider the budget constraints, there is no core outcome. Suppose
buyer b1 obtains {A,B} for a combined price of at most 3. Then there is at least one seller with
a payoff lower than 2 and buyer b2 and this sellers can form a coalition in which both are better
off. Similarly, suppose b2 obtains one of his desired items at one of the sellers while b1 does not
obtain any items. Since the combined payoff of the sellers is at most 2, b1 and the sellers can form
a coalition where all three are better off.
The proof of Theorem 1 illustrates that it can be quite intricate to detect whether the core of a
combinatorial exchange is empty or not. A combinatorial exchange with budget constraints on the
buyers’ side can be seen as a game with partially transferable utility. The problem has a specific
structure and therefore is important to understand its computational complexity.
Theorem 2. Computing a welfare-maximizing core outcome in a combinatorial exchange with
budget constraint is Σp2-hard
Proof techniques for this complexity class are much less developed than those for lower levels in
the polynomial hierarchy. The proof (see Appendix) reduces from QSAT2 and requires an elaborate
construction. A reduction from more abstract problems such as min max clique, which are known
to be Σp2-hard, appears simpler at first sight, but has shown not to be straightforward.
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An interesting question is whether there are some sufficient conditions for the core of the combi-
natorial exchange that are simple to check. For transferable utility games the Bondareva-Shapley
theorem describes balancedness as a necessary and sufficient condition for the core of a cooper-
ative game with transferable utility (TU) to be non-empty (see Bondareva (1963) and Shapley
(1967)). Balancedness is a rather obscure property, but it can be checked with linear programming
in transferable utility games, and linear programming was also used to decide whether the core is
empty in combinatorial exchanges without budget constraints (Bichler and Waldherr 2017).
A combinatorial exchange with budget constraints is closer to a game with non-transferable
utility (NTU). The main result for NTU-games is that balanced games have a nonempty core, but
the converse is not true (Scarf 1967). So, balancedness is a requirement that is sufficient for TU and
NTU games to have a non-empty core. Scarf’s algorithm is a central result to compute whether the
core of an NTU game is empty. Unfortunately, this algorithm is already PPAD-complete (Kintali
2008). Moreover, the algorithm requires a matrix as an input that has a column with the payoff of
each player for every coalition. In a combinatorial exchange with budget constraints, every coalition
can have multiple allocations with different payoffs. Moreover, we have partially transferable utility
(up to the budget constraint), and the payoff vectors for each coalition are not unique for a coalition
as is the case for a pure NTU game, but depend on the prices. This renders Scarf’s algorithm not
applicable.
3.2. Computing Core Payments via MIBLPs
Next, we show that mixed integer bilevel linear programs (MIBLP) provide an adequate math-
ematical abstraction to model the problem. This is a field of mathematical optimization that is
notoriously hard, but recent algorithmic advances suggest that such problems can be solved in
practice (Zeng and An 2014, Fischetti et al. 2017, Tahernejad et al. 2017).
The MIBLP we suggest finds core allocations in combinatorial exchanges with budget constraints.
If the core is not empty, the solution of the bilevel program consists of a core allocation with
maximum welfare. Additionally, we obtain prices and payments for buyers and sellers. If the core
is empty, the MIBLP is infeasible.
The objective of of the MIBLP is to find prices P = {Pi, Pj}, such that the corresponding
allocation (X,Y ) is in the core and there is no core allocation with a higher welfare. We maximize
gains from trade as the standard way to maximize welfare in double auctions.
In the lower level of the bilevel program, for each coalition of bidders C ⊂ I ∪J =N , the smallest
improvement dC of any member of C when deviating from the grand coalition is calculated. For
this, given the set of buyers I(C) and sellers J(C) in the coalition, as well as the set of items K(C)
which is endowed to sellers part of C, an allocation of bundles S,Z ⊆K(C) is determined. Thus,
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in the lower level, variables χCi (S) ∈ {0,1} and γCj (Z) ∈ {0,1} denote the allocation of bundles
S,Z ⊆K(C) within coalition C and pCi (S), pCj (Z) describe the corresponding prices and payments.
Then, the bilevel program can be written as (CEx). For convenience, the bilevel program is
presented with multiple lower levels, one for each coalition C ⊆N and with (non-linear) multipli-
cations of variables for the allocations and the corresponding price (e.g. in constraint (BB)). Both
can be easily rewritten as a mixed integer linear bilevel program with a single lower level.
max
xi(S),yj(Z)
∑
S⊆K
∑
i∈I
vi(S)xi(S)−
∑
j∈J
∑
Z⊆K
vj(Z)yj(Z) (CEx)
s.t.
∑
S⊆K
pi(S)xi(S)≤min
Bi, ∑
S⊆K
vi(S)xi(S)
 ∀i∈ I (BC)
pj(Z)yj(Z)≥ vj(Z)yj(Z) ∀Z ⊆K,∀j ∈ J (IRS)∑
i∈I
∑
S⊆K
pi(S)xi(S) =
∑
j∈J
∑
Z⊆K
pj(Z)yj(Z) (BB)
∑
S:k∈K
∑
i∈I
xi(S)≤
∑
Z:k∈K
∑
j∈J
yj(Z) ∀k ∈K (Supply)
∑
S⊆K
xi(S)≤ 1 ∀i∈ I (XOR-B)
∑
Z⊆K
yj(Z)≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J (XOR-S)
d
C ≤ 0 ∀C ⊂ I ∪ J (Core)
d
C
= maxd
C ∀C ⊂ I ∪ J (Lower Level)
s.t.
∑
S⊆K(C)
p
C
i (S)χ
C
i (S)≤min
Bi, ∑
S⊆K(C)
vi(S)χ
C
i (S)
 ∀i∈ I(C) (BC)
p
C
j (Z)γ
C
j (Z)≥ vj(Z)γCj (Z) ∀j ∈ J(C),∀Z ⊆K (IRS)∑
i∈I(C)
∑
S⊆K(C)
p
C
i (S)χ
C
i (S) =
∑
j∈J(C)
∑
Z⊆K(C)
p
C
j (Z)γ
C
j (Z) (BB)
∑
S:k∈K(C)
∑
i∈I
χ
C
i (S)≤
∑
Z⊆K(C)
γ
C
j (Z) ∀k ∈K(C) (Supply)
∑
S⊆K(C)
χ
C
i (S)≤ 1 ∀i∈ I(C) (XOR-B)
∑
Z⊆K(C)
γ
C
j (Z)≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J(C) (XOR-S)
d
C ≤
∑
S⊆K(C)
(
vi(S)− pCi (S)
)
χ
C
i (S)−
∑
S⊆K
(vi(S)− pi(S))xi(S) ∀i∈ I(C) (Imp-B)
d
C ≤
∑
Z⊆K(C)
p
C
j (Z)γ
C
(Z)−
∑
Z⊆K
pj(Z)yj(Z) ∀j ∈ J(C) (Imp-S)
χ
C
i (S)∈ {0,1} ∀S ⊆K(C), i∈ I(C) (Binary)
γ
C
j (Z)∈ {0,1} ∀Z ⊆K(C), j ∈ J(C) (Binary)
p
C
i (S)∈ R+0 ∀S ⊆K(C), i∈ I(C) (Real)
p
C
j (Z)∈ R+0 ∀Z ⊆K(C), j ∈ J(C) (Real)
d
C ∈ R (Real)
xi(S)∈ {0,1} ∀S ⊆K, i∈ I (Binary)
yj(Z)∈ {0,1} ∀Z ⊆K,j ∈ J (Binary)
pi(S)∈ R+0 ∀S ⊆K, i∈ I (Real)
pj(Z)∈ R+0 ∀Z ⊆K,j ∈ J (Real)
The objective of (CEx) is to maximize gains from trade by determining an assignment of pack-
ages and corresponding prices, such that the prices respect the budget constraints and individual
rationality of buyers (BC) and sellers (IRS), and budget balance (BB). Further, only items which
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are sold can be allocated to buyers (Supply), each buyer may only obtain at most one package
(XOR-B) and each seller may only sell at most one package consisting of the items endowed to him
(XOR-S). The prices have to be set in such a way, that no coalition can benefit from deviating. For
each coalition C, an assignment χC , γC with payments PC is determined in the lower level. Similar
to the upper level, these assignments have to respect budget constraints (BC), budget balance (BB)
and the supply constraint (Supply). Particularly, only items offered by sellers part of the coalition
may be allocated. Constraints (Imp-B) and (Imp-S) denote the improvements for each individual
buyer and seller when participating in this coalition in comparison to the grand coalition. The
objective of the lower level is to maximize the minimum improvement. For the allocation (X,Y )
and the corresponding payments to be in the core, this improvement must not be positive for any
coalition (Core).
Instead of multiple lower levels, we can rewrite the lower level optimization problem in vector
notation as
d= max
∑
C⊂I∪J
dC
and calculate the allocations for each coalition simultaneously in the lower level since variables
from different coalitions are independent from each other. Products of continuous price variables
p and binary variables x, y,χ, γ can be linearized by introducing auxiliary variables.
Note that in cases where the core is empty, we can relax the core constraint to dC ≤ ε, where
ε is a small number that allows for a feasible solution. This variable could be minimized in the
objective function of CEx. As a result we would get a least core solution. Alternative solution
concepts when the core is empty are the nucleolus or the kernel, but they are computationally
more demanding such that we do not consider them further in this paper.
A key challenge for the implementation of CEx is the fact that the number of follower constraints
is exponential in the cardinality of the bidders’ set. In addition, we have a number of bilinear
terms such as pi(S)xi(S) and pj(Z)yj(Z) which need to be linearized. Note that the bi-linear term∑
S⊆K pi(S)xi(S) in constraints (BC) and (BB) can easily be replaced by a single variable pi (pj)
for non-linear and personalized prices. In contrast, sometimes an auctioneer might want to have
non-linear but anonymous prices and he could replace the variables pi(S) (pj(Z)) for all i (j) by a
single variable p(S) (p(Z)) for each package S (Z). Note that neither personalized nor anonymous
prices might be unique.
3.3. Calculating the least core
Unfortunately, the core of the combinatorial exchange can also be empty, i.e. there may exist no
allocation of items with prices for which there is no blocking coalition. However, the gains for
each coalition might only be marginal and exceed the costs of finding such a blocking coalition for
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the participants. In cooperative game theory, the least core is defined as the set of outcomes for
which the maximum profit of a blocking coalition is minimal. For the combinatorial combinato-
rial exchange as defined above, this corresponds to minimizing the maximal improvement of the
coalitions in comparison to the upper level allocation and prices. Then, instead of maximizing the
gains from trade, a least core assignment can be determined by defining the maximal improvement
∆ ≥ max{0,maxC dC} and replacing the objective function by min∆. Another possibility is to
define a combination of the objective functions, assigning weights to the gains from trade and the
maximal possible improvement.
4. Algorithmic Approaches to the General Problem
In this section, we discuss algorithmic approaches to solving MIBLPs in general. Then, we introduce
computations allowing us to reduce the number of coalitions we need to consider in the general
case and a decomposition approach that reduces the problem size significantly in practice.
4.1. Mixed Integer Bilevel Linear Programs
Bilevel optimization has its roots in the seminal work by Von Stackelberg (1934). Bilevel linear
programs (BLPs) are already NP -hard, and integer bilevel programs (IBLPs) are Σp2-complete
(Jeroslow 1985). For the following discussion, we introduce the short hand of a generic mixed
integer bilevel program (MIBLP):
maxF (x, y)
s.t.G(x, y)≤ 0
y ∈ argmin{f(x, y′), s.t.g(x, y′)≤ 0, y′ ∈ Y }
x∈X
Here, F,f,G and g are linear functions and X,Y ⊂ Z×R are the respective domains of upper-
level variables x and lower-level variables y.
Bard and Moore (1990) initiated algorithmic solutions to mixed integer bilevel linear programs
(MIBLPs). Their algorithm converges if either all leader variables are integer, or when the follower
subproblem is an LP. Until recently, MIBLPs were considered ”still unsolved by the operations
research community” (Delgadillo et al. 2010). Only this year, two general purpose branch-and-cut
MIBLP algorithms have been proposed by Fischetti et al. (2017) and Tahernejad et al. (2017).
Fischetti et al. (2017) extend their earlier algorithm for MIBLPs with binary first-level variables
to problems where linking variables are discrete. In a very recent unpublished paper, Tahernejad
et al. (2017) propose another general-purpose MIBLP solver based on branch-and-cut which is
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available open source in the MibS solver. The latter requires the linking variables, those variables
that have non-zero coefficients and are present in the upper- and lower-level program, to be integer.
Since for our domain, the linking variables contain (possibly non-integer) upper level prices, we
implemented the column-and-constraint generation algorithm proposed by Zeng and An (2014),
which is applicable to general mixed-integer bilevel problems.
In the following, we give a short outline of the algorithm by Zeng and An (2014). First, a
single-level reformulation of the bilevel program is introduced, wherein all lower level variables
and constraints are duplicated into the upper level and a classical MILP is solved which yields a
solution that is feasible with respect to upper and lower level constraints. However, assignment of
the lower level variables does not necessarily yield an optimal solution for the lower level problem
and the solution of this relaxation only serves as an upper bound UB for the MIBLP. Given an
optimal assignment x∗ of the upper level variables in the single-level reformulation, the lower level
problem is then solved to optimality, yielding an assignment y∗ for the lower level variables. If the
combined solution (x∗, y∗) is feasible for the MILBP, then F (x∗, y∗) is a lower bound LB for its
optimal solution. In the case that LB = UB, (x∗, y∗) is also an optimal solution. Otherwise, let
yZ ∈ YZ consist of the lower level variables with integer domain and yR ∈ YR denote the continuous
lower level variables. The single-level reformulation is extended by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
optimality conditions of the lower level with the integer variables fixed to y∗Z. The procedure
continues as described above, until lower bound and upper bound converge to the same value or the
single-level reformulation is infeasible. While in the worst case, the algorithm requires enumeration
of all possible assignments of the lower level integer variables, in practice it converges in only a few
iterations.
4.2. Introducing Cuts to Reduce the Number of Coalitions
Our goal is to find the core allocation that maximizes welfare. A few problem specifics raise hope
that we can reduce the number of coalitions significantly. First, we introduce (B) a program to
compute allocations based on the valuations capped by the budget constraint.
wB = max
∑
i∈I
∑
S⊆K min{Bi, vi(S)}xi(S)−
∑
j∈J
∑
Z⊆K vj(Z)yj(Z)
s.t. xi(S)−
∑
x:xi=S
δX,Y = 0 ∀i∈ I,∀S ⊆K (pi(S))
−yj(Z) +
∑
y:yj=Z
δX,Y = 0 ∀j ∈ J,∀Z ⊆K (pj(Z))∑
S⊆K xi(S)≤ 1 ∀i∈ I (pii)∑
Z⊆K yj(Z)≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J (pij)∑
(X,Y )∈Γ δX,Y = 1 (pia)
0≤ xi(S) ∀S ⊆K,∀i∈ I
0≤ yj(Z) ∀S ⊆K,∀j ∈ J
0≤ δX,Y ∀(X,Y )∈ Γ
(B)
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The allocation from (B) does not need to be the one that maximizes welfare, but model (B) can
be instrumental to cut the number of coalitions in (CEx).
We use α as a short hand to describe the optimal allocation (X(α), Y (α)) resulting from (P) and
β to denote the optimal allocation resulting from (B). We use Cα to describe the corresponding
coalition of bidders in allocation α.
Theorem 3. If (P) is feasible, then the capped coalitional value wB(α) of an optimal allocation
α computed by (P) cannot be higher than the capped coalitional value wB(β) of an optimal allocation
β for (B), i.e wB(α)≤wB(β).
Proof: Allocation α= (X(α), Y (α)) is a feasible for (P). Hence, (X(α), Y (α)) ∈ Γ in (B) and
X(α), Y (α), δX(α),Y (α) is feasible for (B). Then, the result immediately follows, since β is optimal
for (B). Q.E.D.
Note that it can well happen that for an optimal allocation α of (P) and an optimal allocation
β of (B) it holds that wB(α)<wB(β), although wP (α)>wP (β).
Example 2. Suppose we have a market with two buyers and two sellers selling one of two items
each as described in Table 2. The sellers have zero value for the objects in this example. An optimal
solution β of (B) would be to assign A to b1 for a price of zero and B to b2 for a price of $2 with
wB(β) =wP (β) = 4. This allocation would not be in the core, because bidder b1 would prefer item
B and be willing to pay a price of say $2.5 to the seller, the coalition of b1 and the seller of B is
a blocking coalition. In (P), an optimal solution α would consist of b1 receiving B for a price of 2,
for example, resulting in wP (α) = 10>wP (β) = 4 but at the same time wB(α) = 3<wB(β) = 4.
Table 2 Example
{A} {B} Bi
b1 2 10 3
b2 2 2
Still, this observation can vastly reduce the number of coalitions one needs to explore, because
we can ignore coalitions Cα where wP (α)<wP (β) in (CEx). This means, before setting up (CEx),
one can compute (B) and (P) for all coalitions and omit those where wP (α)<wP (β) in the (CEx).
Note that (B) has a variable δX,Y for each allocation. While this formulation is a linear program,
the number of variables might not be practical. Instead of (B), we can also compute the upper-level
program as a set packing problem, capping vi(S) by min{Bi, vi(S)} to get wB(β).
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4.3. Decomposition by Delayed Coalition Generation
Another approach to cope with the exponential number of coalitions in the MIBLP is the delayed
generation of coalitions. Instead of determining an allocation and corresponding prices which are
in the core with respect to all possible coalitions, we determine an initial set of coalitions C ⊆ C
and solve the MIBLP, only considering coalitions in C.
For example, this initial set C can be a set of smaller coalitions with high gains from trade that
are sufficiently different from the grand coalition, because they might be able to redistribute their
gains from trade in a way that is better for all of them. These coalitions have a higher likelihood
of becoming a blocking coalition. The auctioneer can compute the optimal allocation of all smaller
coalitions Cˆl ⊆C up to a limited number of participants l. Computing the allocation problem (P)
for small coalitions of only a few bidders c ∈ Cˆl can be done fast in practice. Then, the auctioneer
selects those coalitions with a high objective function value and a high Hamming distance between
the optimal allocation of (P) considering the grand coalition C and that of the a small coalition
c∈ Cˆl and add it to C.
The gains from trade we obtain for the allocation (x∗, y∗) and prices p∗ that are feasible with
regards to the set C serve as an upper bound for the complete problem considering all possible
coalitions. Moreover, in the case that there is no core outcome for the set C, there is also no core
outcome for the complete problem.
To check whether the allocation (x∗, y∗) and prices p∗ are feasible with regards to all other
coalitions C \ C, we only need to solve the lower level problem (i.e. an integer program) for these
coalitions. Suppose, there is a coalition C0 with d
C0 > 0, then the solution of the MIBLP for
coalitions C is not in the core for all coalitions C. In this case, we extend the set C to the set
C′ = C ∪{C0} and solve the MIBLP again, considering coalitions C′. On the other hand, if there is
no coalition C0 ∈C \C with dC0 > 0, the solution of the MIBLP for coalitions C is in the core when
considering all coalitions and thus yields an allocation and prices with maximal gains from trade.
Then, we are done. Using this decomposition approach employed in our numerical experiments, we
could often significantly reduce the size of the MIBLPs that needed to be solved.
5. Restricted Cases
The complexity analysis of the allocation problem in combinatorial auctions has drawn considerable
attention and led to a characterization of tractable cases where the LP relaxation is integral (Mu¨ller
2006). These cases often depend on the types of valuations which are typically unknown ex ante.
Total unimodularity of the constraint matrix of the allocation problem or substitutes valuations
are an example for tractable cases.
In this section we analyze important special cases of the problem (CEx), which are simple
to characterize ex ante and not Σp2-hard. A simple case is obviously when none of the budget
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constraints is binding, which leads to the traditional case with quasi-linear utilities (Bichler and
Waldherr 2017). Another extreme case is where the budget constraints are all zero such that with
a given set of sellers who have some positive value for the good, there would be no trade.
In the following, we discuss single-sided combinatorial auctions with non-zero, but binding budget
constraints, and combinatorial exchanges where we only care about blocking dyadic coalitions.
Both allow for computations that are NP -hard, but not Σp2-hard.
5.1. Restricting to One-Sided Auctions
If we had a combinatorial auction with only a single seller (or only a single buyer, resp.), we are
able to decouple the allocation and pricing problem. With a single seller, we can solve (B). This
allocation maximizes the revenue of the seller such that he does not have an incentive to deviate.
In case of a unique optimal allocation, buyers with a high value but low budget cannot deviate
and make themselves and the seller better of. The concept of the (weak) core requires that there
does not exist a coalition of buyers and the seller such that they all (strictly) prefer an alternative
allocation.
The integer program (CA-S) replaces the LP (B) with the large number of variables δX,Y and
computes an allocation that maximizes seller revenue. Subsequently, we can compute core prices
based on the capped valuations following the algorithms suggested by Day and Raghavan (2007)
or Erdil and Klemperer (2010). In such an allocation, the seller cannot improve his utility (i.e.
revenue) strictly yielding a weak core solution.
z∗ = max
xi(S)
∑
S⊆K
∑
i∈I
min(Bi, vi(S))xi(S) (CA-S)
subject to ∑
S:k∈K
∑
i∈I
xi(S)≤ 1 ∀k ∈K (Supply)∑
S⊆K
xi(S)≤ 1 ∀i∈ I (XOR)
xi(S)∈ {0,1} ∀S ⊆K, i∈ I (Binary)
After computing (CA-S), there is still a possibility that there is another stable allocation with
the same objective function value or seller revenue, but a higher payoff for the buyers based on
their uncapped valuations. This means that we can achieve a weak core outcome with a higher
welfare, which is also our goal in (CEx). For this, we solve a second optimization problem (CA-B)
before the core-price computations, in order to get weak core outcomes.
max
xi(S)
∑
S⊆K
∑
i∈I
vi(S)xi(S) (CA-B)
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subject to ∑
S⊆K
∑
i∈I
min(Bi, vi(S))xi(S)≥ z∗∑
S:k∈K
∑
i∈I
xi(S)≤ 1 ∀k ∈K (Supply)∑
S⊆K
xi(S)≤ 1 ∀i∈ I (XOR)
xi(S)∈ {0,1} ∀S ⊆K, i∈ I (Binary)
Note that the strong core refers to an outcome, where there is no coalition that could make all
its members at least as good and at least one member better off. In single-sided auctions the strong
core can be empty. To see this, consider an auction with a single object and two bidders with the
same value v. In the first allocation, the seller sells the object to buyer 1 at price p ≤ v, in the
second allocation he sells to bidder 2 at price p. In both cases, the revenue of the auctioneer does
not increase, but there is one bidder, whose payoff would increase strictly. Similarly, suppose that
we get a winning coalition C ⊂ I from (CA-S) and another winning coalition C ′ with a different
set of buyers after we compute (CA-B). Now, if we switch back from C ′ to coalition C this set of
buyers improves payoff while the revenue of the seller remains the same.
5.2. Restricting the Size of Coalitions
The concept of the core considers coalitions of any size. Large coalitions are costly to form. However,
it is simpler and therefore more likely to find blocking pairs of one buyer and one seller only.
For some applications, it might be sufficient to find a solution that avoids deviations of dyadic
coalitions. We do so with the mixed binary program (DY).
For this, we introduce variables ρij(S)∈ {0,1} for each possible package trade between a buyer i
and seller j over all packages S ⊂K(j) where K(j) denotes all bundles Z ⊆K which are offered by
j. The variable ρ is set to 1, whenever a dyadic coalition would form a blocking coalition. Similar to
the general problem, we introduce constraints such that only outcomes without blocking coalitions
are feasible.
Constraints (Block-B) to (No-Block) characterize blocking dyads and require some explanation.
Note that a buyer i would want to deviate if his payoff vi(S)− pij(S)> pii where pij(S) is some
transfer price in a blocking dyad. Similarly, a seller j would want to deviate if pij(S)− vj(S)>pij.
Rearranging terms, pij +vj(S)< vi(S)−pii characterizes a blocking coalition, i.e. with pij +vj(S)≥
vi(S) − pii a dyad would not be blocking (see (Block-Imp)). We also need to consider budget
constraints of buyers Bi. With pij + vj(S)>Bi in constraint (Block-B), we avoid payments to the
seller j characterized by the LHS of the constraint that are higher than the budget of the buyer Bi.
The binary variable γij(S) = 1 indicates if a dyad would deviate due to improvement in payoffs,
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variable δij(S) = 1 if the required payments would exceed budget. Constraint (No-Block) demands
that a dyad can only be willing to deviate due to payoffs if the required payments would exceed
the budget of the buyer involved, since otherwise this dyad would be blocking the outcome.
max
xi(S),yj(Z)
∑
S⊆K
∑
i∈I
vi(S)xi(S)−
∑
j∈J
∑
Z⊆K
vj(Z)yj(Z)ρijS (DY)
s.t.
∑
S⊆K
pi(S)xi(S)≤min
Bi, ∑
S⊆K
vi(S)xi(S)
 ∀i∈ I (BC)
pj(Z)yj(Z)≥ vj(Z)yj(Z) ∀Z ⊆K,∀j ∈ J (IRS)∑
i∈I
∑
S⊆K
pi(S)xi(S) =
∑
j∈J
∑
Z⊆K
pj(Z)yj(Z) (BB)
∑
S:k∈K
∑
i∈I
xi(S)≤
∑
Z:k∈K
∑
j∈J
yj(Z) ∀k ∈K (Supply)
∑
S⊆K
xi(S)≤ 1 ∀i∈ I (XOR-B)
∑
Z⊆K
yj(Z)≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J (XOR-S)
pii =
∑
S⊆K
(vi(S)− pi(S))xi(S) ∀i∈ I (payoffB)
pij =
∑
Z⊆K
(pj(Z)− vj(Z))yj(Z) ∀j ∈ J (payoffS)
pij + vj(S)≥Biδij(S) ∀i∈ I,∀j ∈ J,∀S ⊆K(j) (Block-B)
pij + vj(S)≥ vi(S)−pii −Mγij(S) ∀i∈ I,∀j ∈ J,∀S ⊆K(j) (Block-Imp)
δij(S)≥ γij(S) ∀i∈ I,∀j ∈ J,∀S ⊆K(j) (No-Block)
xi(S)∈ {0,1} ∀S ⊆K, i∈ I (Binary)
yj(Z)∈ {0,1} ∀Z ⊆K,j ∈ J (Binary)
δij(S), γij(S), ρij(S)∈ {0,1} ∀i∈ I,∀j ∈ J,∀S ⊆K(j) (Binary)
pii, pi(S)∈ R+0 ∀S ⊆K, i∈ I (Real)
pij , pj(Z)∈ R+0 ∀Z ⊆K,j ∈ J (Real)
Beyond dyadic coalitions, one could restrict the cardinality of coalitions to those with only three
or four participants. Even the computation of the coalitional value of these small coalitions is NP-
hard in general. However, such a restriction on the coalitions reduces the number of lower-level
programs in (CEx) from 2|K|− 1 to ∑ki=1 (|K|i ) with k being the maximum size of the coalition.
6. Experimental Results
Even though the problem of finding a core allocation is computationally very hard to solve exactly
in the worst case, it can still be possible to solve problem sizes that are practically relevant. We
provide experimental results suggesting that the computation of core outcomes in the presence of
budget constraints might well be possible for restricted problem sizes even on commodity hardware.
We ran a number of experiments on a standard laptop with an Intel Core 17-7600U CPU (2.9
GHz) with 16 GB memory on a 64-bit Windows operating system. Our implementation for the
MIBLP is based on that of Zeng and An (2014) extended by the decomposition by delayed coalition
generation described in the previous section.
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6.1. Data
In our introduction, we have described combinatorial exchanges for fishery access rights and airport
time slots as motivating examples. Unfortunately, there are no publicly available datasets of combi-
natorial exchanges that we are aware of. However, the Combinatorial Auctions Test Suite (CATS)
(Leyton-Brown et al. 2000) is the most widely used benchmark for the evaluation of algorithms
for the combinatorial auction problem. One of the CATS instance generators models the airport
time slot problem, which can be seen as a combinatorial exchange mechanism among airlines. This
allows us to provide experimental results that can be replicated by others.
This instance generator models the four largest USA airports, each having a predefined number
of departure and arrival time slots. For simplicity there is only one slot for each time unit available.
Each bidder is interested in obtaining one departure and one arrival slot (i.e., item) in two randomly
selected airports. His valuation is proportional to the distance between the airports and reaches
a maximum when the arrival time matches a certain randomly selected value. The valuation is
reduced if the arrival time deviates from this optimal value, or if the time between departure and
arrival slots is longer than necessary. Further, we extended the CATS generator to include budget
constraints for bidders. For each bidder, her budget is generated by a random uniform draw from
the interval of zero to her maximal valuation for any of her desired item.
6.2. Results
We report the results of the allocation and pricing problem in the combinatorial exchange of
airport time slots created with the CATS instance generator. Treatment variables include the
number of airlines (referred to as bidders) and the number of time slots (referred to as items)
which we distributed evenly across the four airports. Further, we evaluated the outcomes when
we only consider blocking coalitions of three or five participants instead of blocking coalitions of
unrestricted size. We will refer to such outcomes where we only check for blocking coalitions with
at most n bidders as n-core. Given that it is computationally very hard to find deviating coalitions,
an outcome that is stable against coalitions of smaller size might be a sufficient stability notion in
practice.
Table 4 shows the average results of 50 random instances for each of the treatment combinations.
We report the number of items and bidders as parameters for the problem size, as well as the
maximum size of the coalitions we consider. The number of coalitions up to a specific size is shown
in Table 3. For each treatment combination we report how many of the 50 instances could be
solved within five minutes (i.e. either a welfare-maximizing core outcome was found or the core
was proven to be empty) as well as the average runtime of those instances for which our MIBLP
implementation terminates within 5 minutes.
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|I| size 3 size 5 unrestricted size
3 18 54 59
7 42 462 1,341
11 66 1,606 22,407
Table 3 Number of coalitions of up to a specific size for the problem sets.
3-core 5-core unb. coal. size
|I| |K| solved avg. runtime solved avg. runtime solved avg. runtime
3 6 50 0.10 50 0.52 50 0.55
3 12 50 0.05 50 0.40 50 0.52
3 18 50 0.06 50 0.22 50 0.35
3 24 50 0.10 50 0.55 50 1.03
7 6 50 0.30 50 0.75 50 1.82
7 12 50 0.20 50 8.96 36 206.64
7 18 50 0.36 48 9.28 30 385.48
7 24 50 1.27 50 26.78 33 404.63
11 6 50 1.03 50 6.20 50 49.04
11 12 50 1.29 41 48.90 8 211.98
11 18 50 2.51 47 48.91 5 238.24
11 24 50 3.65 48 53.64 3 181.63
Table 4 Solved instances and average runtimes in seconds of 50 random instances
It can be seen that the problem sets with three or seven bidders can all be solved within an average
of one to two seconds even when considering all possible coalitions. Even for 11 bidders all instances
of the problem set with 6 items can be solved within an average of 50 seconds. For 7 bidders,
we were still able to solve at least 30 of the 50 instances for each treatment combination. Even
for the largest problem sets, it was possible to obtain solutions within five minutes on commodity
hardware. Note that when considering only coalitions of size up to 3 or 5, almost all instances could
be solved. We have taken the largest instances with 11 bidders and 24 items and run them with a
time limit of 30 minutes. While the results did not change significantly, this allowed us to find a
5-core solution for the two remaining instances and obtain solutions for five additional instances
without restrictions of the core.
In Table 5, we report the number of instances where the core is not empty when considering
three, five, or an unbounded size of blocking coalitions. Further, we show how many of the welfare-
optimal core outcomes that were computed on the basis of being stable against blocking coalitions
of size at most three (3-core) are not even blocked by coalitions of larger sizes (in 5-core or in core).
Similarly, we also report the number of coalitions that are in the 5-core and how many of them are
in the core, i.e. stable against all possible coalitions. Note that this is straightforward to check by
evaluating the allocation and prices in the 5-core against all possible coalitions, for example. Such
outcomes are also welfare-optimal core outcomes when considering these coalitions.
Interestingly, in the largest problem set with 11 bidders and 24 items, 8 of the outcomes that
are in the 5-core are in the core in general. This is more than the number of core outcomes that
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we could compute in time in via the MIBLP approach (see Table 4). In other words, an n-core
solution can often be a core solution even if the core outcome is intractable.
3-core 5-core core
|I| |K| in 3-core in 5-core in core in 5-core in core in core
3 6 47 47 47 47 47 47
3 12 50 35 35 50 50 50
3 18 50 42 42 50 50 50
3 24 50 45 45 50 50 50
7 6 48 48 48 48 48 48
7 12 50 6 3 50 23 36
7 18 50 11 5 48 13 30
7 24 50 16 8 50 21 33
11 6 47 47 47 47 47 47
11 12 50 2 0 41 10 8
11 18 50 8 2 47 4 5
11 24 50 8 2 48 8 3
Table 5 Number of instances with a welfare-maximal outcome that are in 3-core, 5-core, and in the core wrt.
all possible coalitions. Additionally, number of these outcomes that are in the core for coalitions of larger sizes.
A more extensive experimental evaluation with different types of problem instances is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, the results indicate that even though the general problem of
finding a core-stable outcome in a combinatorial exchange with budget constraints is Σp2-complete,
computing n-core outcomes can be a viable approach in practice.
7. Conclusions
We analyze combinatorial exchanges in the presence of financially constrained bidders. Our analysis
shows that budget constraints lead to additional core constraints in the allocation problem, and
that as a result computing allocation and prices becomes Σp2-hard. We introduce mathematical
optimization problems effective computational techniques to solve these problems for restricted
problem sizes in practice. Even if we could only compute core-stable outcomes that are stable
against small but not all coalitions, this might provide a sufficient level of stability in practice.
This is, because it will be as difficult for participants as it is for the auctioneer to find a blocking
coalition.
We emphasized stability over other design desiderata in our paper, and this deserves some
discussion. Even in those cases where we can compute a core-stable allocation considering the
budget constraints and valuations of bidders, it is clear that these financial constraints restrict the
possible gains from trade and the allocation will likely be different and with lower welfare than
an allocation not considering budget constraints and just the valuations. However, in a matching
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market without money if sellers had some positive value for their goods and buyers are not able to
pay, then no trade would take place and no gains from trade would emerge.
Note that stability is a first-order design goal also in other markets, even if it is at the expense of
allocative efficiency. For example, it is well-known that the deferred acceptance algorithm by Gale
and Shapley (1962) is stable but not efficient, while the top trading cycles algorithm by Shapley
and Scarf (1974) is efficient, but not stable. Later, Roth (2002) showed on the basis of empirical
observations that stability is a key feature of successful matching mechanisms in practice. We argue
that the stability of a market outcome is also important in price-guided markets such as that for
fishery access rights discussed in the introduction.
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Figure 1 Illustration of buyers’ interests, only concerning items of type ψ
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Appendix A: Complexity Analysis
In the following we prove that finding a welfare-maximizing core allocation with exogenous budget constraints
is Σp2-complete by a reduction from the canonical Σ
p
2-complete problem QSAT2.
2-Quantified Satisfiability, QSAT2: Given a n + m variable Boolean formula ϕ(x, y) in DNF with
x= (x1, . . . , xn) and y= (y1, . . . , ym) is it true that ∃x∀yϕ(x, y)?
A.1. Membership in Σp2
We first prove that the problem of finding a core outcome of welfare D is in the class Σp2. Let
x(S), y(Z), p(S), p(Z) be a certificate for the allocations and prices. The gains from trades can be easily
verified in polynomial time by using this certificate. Further, showing that this outcome is in the core is
in co−NP since any blocking coalition C with corresponding assignments χC(S), γC(Z), pC(S), pC(Z) is a
certificate that the outcome is not in the core.
A.2. Idea behind the transformation
Before formally proving the theorem, we give a short explanation of the reduction and the ensuing relationship
between an instance of QSAT2 and the corresponding combinatorial exchange. We concentrate on the main
items and buyers with a direct correspondence to the world of QSAT2 and omit the various auxiliary items,
buyers and sellers. For these, we refer to the complete description of the transformation below.
In the combinatorial exchange, we define items relating to the truth assignment of x and y variables as
well as the truth values which clauses evaluate to. For the variables x and y, items χ and γ are introduced
and the truth assignment of variables x and y in QSAT2 depends on which of the buyers obtains these items.
Each clause is represented by n2 items of type ψ which will indicate whether the clause evaluates to true or
false, again depending on which buyers obtain which of these items.
We introduce different types of buyers. For i ≤ n, buyers BKi and BMi , each concerned with the items
corresponding to the truth assignments of variable xi and the clauses affected by it. For j ≤m, buyers BGj ,
which are concerned with the items corresponding to the truth assignments of yj and the clauses affected by
it. The construction is such that either all buyers of type BK win one of their preferred packages or they do
not win any items. In the former case, the corresponding instance of QSAT2 evaluates to true, in the latter
case it is false.
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The connection between χ,γ and ψ variables in the exchange and the correspondence of setting clauses
to false by assigning truth values to variables in QSAT2 is done via defining bundles of items in which the
buyers are interested in. Figure 1 demonstrates the situation, showing the items ψ corresponding to three
clauses in form of a matrix (we will refer to these as clause matrices in the following). Additionally, items
χ, γ and bundles in which buyers of the various types are interested in, are shown. Buyer BKi is interested
in either χi or χi items as well as the i-th ’row’ of one clause matrix. More formally, he is interested in the
bundle
(χi ∨χi)∧ ({ψ1i1, . . . ,ψ1in}∨ {ψ2i1, . . . ,ψ2in}∨ · · · ∨ {ψLi1, . . . ,ψLin}) ,
where L is the number of clauses. Buyers BMi are interested in buying one out of χi or χi as well as the
i-th ’column’ in all clause matrices of clauses which include the corresponding xi or xi variable. In Figure
1, a bundle for buyer BM2 , including χ2 and the second column of the first clause matrix (since C1 is the
only clause containing x2) is depicted. Finally, buyers B
G
j are interested in bundles which contain one item
out of γj or γj and complete clause matrices for clauses which include the corresponding yj or yj variables.
As can be seen, the individual bundles block each other and can not be obtained simultaneously for each
clause matrix. The corresponding clause evaluates to true if and only if neither buyers of type BM buys a
column of the matrix or buyers of type BG buy the complete matrix. For example, in Figure 1, no items of
the second clause matrix are won by either a buyer type BM or BG. In this case, buyers of type BK can all
obtain their respective row of the (second) clause matrix. Consequently, for this example, the second clause
and therefore the entire expression evaluates to true.
The valuations and budgets of buyers are defined in such a way that buyers of type BK have the highest
value for their respective bundles, but only small budgets which does not allow them to bid up to their true
valuation. In contrast, buyers BM have high valuations and sufficient budget to buy the bundle they are
interested in. Buyers BG have low valuations and can not compete with buyers BM. However, their budget
is high enough in order to outbid buyers BK. In order to obtain sufficiently high welfare gains, buyers BK
must obtain their desired bundles (i.e. win one of the clause matrices) and the outcome must be stable such
that BG and the sellers do not want to deviate by assigning the items to buyers BG or BM instead. Each
buyer of type BK can only obtain one of his desired bundles containing at least one row in one clause matrix
(see Figure 1, which is equivalent to the corresponding clause evaluating to true in QSAT2), when no other
buyer purchases a column within this matrix.
Buyers BK and BM are designed in such a way that BKi obtains the χi-item corresponding to the truth
assignment of xi and B
M
i its negation. Thus, buyers B
M obtain the columns in each clause matrix relating to
the clauses which are set to false due to the truth assignment of variables x. Because of their lower valuations
and budgets, buyers BG can only compete for columns in clause matrices corresponding to clauses not yet
set to false due to the assignment of x. These buyers maximize their payoffs when they can purchase as
many complete matrices as possible which are not blocked by buyers BM. In QSAT2 this corresponds to
assigning truth values to variables y in such a way that as many as possible of the remaining clauses evaluate
to false (i.e. those which are not already evaluating to false due to the assignment of x variables). Only if
the buyers of type BG cannot manage to block all remaining clause matrices (the y variables in QSAT2),
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buyers BK can purchase rows in at least one of the matrices (the x variables in QSAT2) relating to one clause
which evaluates to true. Then, the assignments of items corresponding to truth values of x is a solution for
the QSAT2 problem. In other words, if B
K win in every allocation, then there exists a stable outcome that
achieves the pre-defined welfare in the decision problem.
A.3. Transformation
We present a transformation with valuations using an XOR bidding language. The transformation can easily
be done for an OR bidding language as well, however this requires additional auxiliary items.
For a given formula ϕ(x, y) with clauses C1, . . . ,CL construct an instance CExϕ(x,y) of a combinatorial
exchange with bidders and items as follows. First, consider n+L+ 2 sellers:
• One seller Sχi for each i= 1, . . . , n. Each seller Sχi offers items χi and χi. These items will later indicate
which logical values have to be assigned to the literals x such that ∀yϕ(x, y) is true.
• One seller Sψl for each l = 1, . . . ,L. Each seller Sψl offers items ψlii′ for i, i′ = 1, . . . , n. The sellers
correspond to the clauses of ϕ(x, y) and below we describe how an allocation of the items from a seller
of type Sψ corresponds to the truth value the corresponding clause evaluates to.
• One seller Sγ,φ who offers items γj , γj for j = 1, . . . ,m as well as items φli for l= 1, . . . ,L and i= 1, . . . , n.
The items of type γ correspond to the possible values which can be assigned to literals y. The items
φli are auxiliary items which indicate which clauses evaluate to false as a result of the assignment of
y. While items of type ψ already correspond to the truth assignments of the clauses, these additional
auxiliary items are necessary in the proof for stability reasons since seller Sγ,φ now also needs to be
part of any blocking coalition involving items corresponding to the truth assignment of clauses.
• One seller Sλ who offers items λki and λ
k
i for i= 1, . . . , n and k = 1,2. These serve as auxiliary items
to increase competition for buyers in order to drive up prices and deplete the budgets of buyers, as we
will describe below
We introduce the following short notations for bundles of items:
• T ψl = {ψli′i|i, i′ = 1, . . . , n}
• T ψ,φli = T ψl ∪{φli}
• Fψli = {ψlii′ |i′ = 1, . . . , n}s
• Fψ,φl = T ψ,φl ∪{φli|i= 1, . . . , n}
Figure 2 illustrates an example for these bundles of items sold by Sψ1 and S
γ,φ. It can be seen that the
bundles intersect with each other in such a way, that if for any i∈ {1, . . . , n}, a bundle Fψli is purchased by a
buyer, no bundle T ψ,φli′ can be purchased for any i′ ∈ {1, . . . , n} and vice versa. Similarly, bundles Fψ,φl and
Tl intersect with all other bundles.
Next, we define the buyers with their preferences and budgets. Let T < 1
n
, U >nL, V > 4U and W > 7nV .
First, we define buyers of type BK and type BM whose assignments will directly correspond to the logical
values of the literals x
• For i= 1, . . . , n let BKi be a buyer with a budget of V + T and a value of W for each of the following
bundles:
Bichler, Waldherr: Combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers
30
Figure 2 Illustration of buyers’ interests, only concerning items of type ψ
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— For l= 1, . . . ,L, bundle Kl := {χi}∪T ψ,φli
— For l= 1, . . . ,L, bundle Kl := {χi}∪T ψ,φli
He is interested in obtaining exactly one of these bundles and his value for obtaining one or more of
the bundles is equal to the maximal value of his obtained bundles.
• For i= 1, . . . , n let BMi be a buyer with a budget of 2V and a value of 2V for the bundles
—Mi := {χi, λ1i , λ2i }∪
⋃
xi∈Cl F
ψ
li
—Mi
{
χi, λ
1
i , λ
2
i
}
∪⋃xi∈Cl Fψli
He is interested in exactly one of these bundles.
Buyers BK and BM are designed in such a way that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, buyer BKi will obtain one of
the items {χi, χi}, while buyer BMi obtains the other item. Whenever BKi buys χi, this corresponds to an
assignment of ’true’ to the corresponding xi and whenever B
K
i buys χi it corresponds to an assignment of
’false’. Buyers BMi obtains the opposite item (corresponding to its negation) as well as the bundles Fψli for
all l which evaluate to ’false’ due to the assignment of BMi . The budgets and valuations are chosen in such
a way, that non of the buyers described below can outbid buyers of type BMi at seller S
ψ
l , i.e. no bundles
containing any item of Tl can be sold when BMi desires Fψli for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In the following, we say
that BMi blocks the bundle Tl (i.e. bundles T ψ,φli for all i as well as bundle Fψ,φl ). We will see in the proof
that when buyers of types BG and BK can only compete for unblocked bundles.
Additionally, we introduce the following auxiliary bidders who drive up prices in order to deplete the
budgets of buyers BK and BM.
• For i= 1, . . . , n, identical buyers Bχ,1i and Bχ,2i who are interested in one of χi or χi, have a valuation
of V for both, as well as a budget of V
• For i= 1, . . . , n one buyer Bλ,1i who has a budget of U and a value of V for bundle λ1i and a value of
V −L for λ1i
• For i= 1, . . . , n one buyer Bλ,2i who has a budget of U and a value of V −L for bundle λ2i and a value
of V for λ
2
i
The reason for including these auxiliary buyers and items is to bind an amount of V of the budget of
buyer BKi to purchase items from seller S
λ such that he only has a budget of T left to purchase his remaining
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Bidder type Value Budget
BK W V +T
BM 2V 2V
BG 1 L
Bχ,1,Bχ,2 V V
Bλ,1 V for λ1 and V −L for λ1 U
Bλ,2 V −L for λ1 and V for λ1 U
Table 6 Values and budgets of key buyer types.
items from sellers of type Sψ and from seller Sγ,φ. In the following, we define the final set of buyers which
compete with buyers BM for these items.
• For j = 1, . . . ,m one buyer BGj who has a budget of L and a value of 1 for each bundle:
—Gjl = {γj}∪Fψ,φl for each l= 1, . . . ,L with Y j ∈Cl
—Glj =
{
γj
}∪Fψ,φl for each l= 1, . . . ,L with Yj ∈Cl
His valuation for obtaining a larger bundle G containing one ore more of the bundles defined above is
equal to
max{|Gl|,|Gl|}−1
n(n+1)
, i.e. the maximum number of bundles of type G and type G he obtains. Thus,
each buyer BGj is only interested in obtaining bundles which do not include both items, γj and γj . We
refer to a bundle which includes only one of these items with a valuation of k as a clean bundle of size
k.
These buyers are designed in a way such that they compete for all bundles Fψ,φl for which no buyer of
type BMi wants to buy bundle Fψli since the latter has a larger budget and higher valuation and thus can
always outbid buyers of type BG. Whenever a buyer of type BG obtains such a bundle, it corresponds to the
corresponding clause to evaluate to ’false’. Buyers of type BG maximize their welfare by purchasing as many
of these packages as possible, corresponding to causing as many clauses to evaluate to ’false’ as possible
which are not do not already evaluate to ’false’ due to buyers of type BM. Only if buyers of type BG can not
buy all of these bundles, buyers of type BK can be assigned their bundles. Similarly to above, we say that a
buyer of type BG blocks bundle T ψ,φl for buyers of type BK if he purchases a bundle which contains Fψ,φl .
A.4. Reduction
In the following, we prove that there exists a core solution in CExϕ(x,y) with a social welfare of at least nW
if and only if ∃x∀yϕ(x, y) is true. We refer to such a core solution as an nW -equilibrium.
First, we will prove these auxiliary results:
Lemma 1: In an nW -equilibrium, for each i= 1, . . . , n, buyer BKi obtains one of the bundles he values
at W .
Lemma 2: In an nW -equilibrium, for each i = 1, . . . , n, buyer BKi obtains one of the items χ
1
i or χ
1
i ,
buyer BMi obtains the complementary item and both pay V to S
χ
i .
Lemma 3: In an nW -equilibrium, for i= 1, . . . , n buyer BMi obtains all his required items from sellers
Sψ and Sλ.
Lemma 4: In any core allocation, buyers of type BG maximize the combined size of their clean bundles
among the ones not blocked by buyers of type BM.
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Lemma 5: There is a nW -equilibrium if and only if for j = 1, . . . ,m, buyers BGj are not able to block
all the remaining bundles for buyers of type BK.
Using these auxiliary results, we will be able to prove the main result.
Lemma 1. In an nW -equilibrium, for each i= 1, . . . , n, buyer BKi obtains one of the bundles he values at
W .
Proof: Assume that a buyerBKi does not obtain his preferred bundle (and thus, the total welfare generated
by the other buyers BKi for i
′ 6= i is at most (n− 1)V ). Then, there is no way to achieve a social welfare of
at least nV since
W > 7nV > 2nV︸︷︷︸
BuyersBM
+ 2nV︸︷︷︸
BuyersBχ
+ 2nV︸︷︷︸
BuyersBλ
+ nL︸︷︷︸
BuyersBG
which is an upper bound on the welfare achievable by all other buyers. Q.E.D.
Thus, in an nW -equilibrium, all buyers of type BK obtain one of their desired bundles. As we described in
the transformation, this is only possible, if there exists at least one l ∈ {1, . . . ,L}, for which neither buyers
of type BM nor of type BG block the bundle T ψ,φl .
The following lemma is a simple observation how auxiliary buyers of type Bχ are used to deplete the
budget of buyers of type BK.
Lemma 2. In an nW -equilibrium, for each i= 1, . . . , n, buyer BKi obtains one of the items χ
1
i or χ
1
i , buyer
BMi obtains the other item and both pay V to S
χ
i .
Proof: If either BKi or B
M
i would pay less than V , then either B
χ,1
i or B
χ,2
i could outbid them and obtain
the respective items: In this case, seller Sχi , all buyers which obtain items from S
χ
i (and in consequence all
further buyers and sellers) can form a coalition and share the additional payment of the buyer of type Bχ
such that all members of this coalitions improve their payoffs. Thus, an assignment where BKi obtains an
item from Sχi but pays less than V can not be in the core. Since all buyers of type B
K need to obtain one
of these items in order to reach an nW -equilibrium, the Lemma holds. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3. In an nW -equilibrium, for i= 1, . . . , n buyer BMi obtains all his required items from sellers S
ψ
and Sλ.
Proof: Because of Lemma 2, in an nW -equilibrium, BMi needs to pay V for the item he obtains from
seller Sχi . Then, he has a budget of V left to obtain the missing items from seller S
λ and sellers Sψl in order
to complete his desired bundle. He needs to purchase items of the form Fψil from Sψl as well as either {λ1i , λ2i }
or
{
λ
1
i , λ
2
i
}
. No other buyer BMj with j 6= i is interested in obtaining any of these items since they appear in
no bundles with positive valuation for them. The only buyers interested in a subset these items are buyers
BKi′ for i
′ = 1, . . . , n (who only have a budget of T left due to Lemma 2), buyers of type BG (who have a
budget of at most L each) and buyers Bλ,1i and B
λ,2
i (with a budget of U each). Since
V > 4U > T︸︷︷︸
BuyersBM
+ nL︸︷︷︸
BuyersBG
+ 2U︸︷︷︸
BuyersBλ
,
buyer BMi can pay sellers S
ψ and Sλ enough to obtain his required items and there is no combination of
buyers that can outbid BMi in order to form a coalition with the sellers such that all improve. Q.E.D.
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The previous Lemma 4 showed that for any i = 1, . . . , n, buyer BMi gets all the items he requires from
sellers Sψ and Sλ and in particular all his required bundles of the form Fψli . Thus, he blocks the bundle Tl
and therefore also all bundles Fψ,φl for sellers of type BG.
Lemma 4. In any core allocation, buyers of type BG maximize the combined size of their clean bundles
among the ones not blocked by buyers of type BM.
Proof: Assume that the maximum combined size of non-blocked clean bundles which can be obtained
by buyers BG is K but that in the core solution buyers do only buy clean bundles with a combined size of
κ≤K − 1. There are no other buyers except for those of type BK which are interested in any of the items
offered by sellers Sλ or sellers Sψl for those l for which Tl is not blocked. Since 1>nT , there can be a coalition
of those sellers and buyers BG which can generate a value of K >κ and distribute the welfare such that all
participants are better off. This is a contradiction to the allocation being in the core. Then, if all buyers BG
pay the valuation of their obtained bundle to seller Sλ, there is no coalition among these sellers and buyers
which want to deviate since Sλ can never improve upon his payoff. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5. There is a nV -equilibrium if and only if for j = 1, . . . ,m, buyers BGj are not able to block all
the remaining bundles for buyers of type BK.
Proof: For any i, l, buyer BKi is only able to obtain one of the sets T ψ,φil if it is neither blocked by a buyer
BM or BG. Thus, there is some l for which all buyers can obtain these items if and only if buyers BG do not
block all of these bundles and as of Lemma 1 there is an nW -equilibrium if and only if all buyers BK obtain
one of their bundles values at W Q.E.D.
Theorem 4. There exists an nW -equilibrium if and only if ∃x∀yϕ(x, y) is true.
Proof: Consider an nW -equilibrium and set xi to true if buyer B
K
i obtains item χi and set xi to false if
he obtains χi. Then, buyer B
M
i obtains the negated item and bundles Fψli for all clauses Cl which evaluate
to ’false’ due to the assignment of xi. This is equivalent to blocking the bundles Tl for buyers BG who
thus compete for the non-blocked bundles. Each combination of bundles obtained by buyer BGj resembles a
number of clauses which can be made false by a truth assignment of yj . If B
G
i obtains γi this corresponds to
an assignment of yi to true and if he obtains γi it corresponds to an assignment of yi to false. As of Lemma
3 and 4, in any core allocation (and hence, especially in an nW -equilibrium buyers BG try to maximize
their combined number of bundles not blocked by buyers of type BM which is equivalent to blocking as
many bundles as possible for buyers of type BK. This corresponds to assigning truth values to y so that as
many clauses as possible evaluate to false in ϕ. However, since by assumption the assignment results in an
nW -equilibrium, buyers BG are not successful in blocking all bundles because of Lemma 5. Therefore, there
is no assignment of variables y such that ϕ(x, y) can be set to false for this assignment of x.
Conversely, let x be a truth assignment such that ∀yϕ(x, y) is true. Then, consider the following trades in
the combinatorial exchange: Trades for seller Sχi for i= 1, . . . , n:
• For i= 1, . . . , n, if xi is true, assign to buyer BKi items χi for a price of V .
• For i= 1, . . . , n, if xi is false, assign to buyer BKi items χi for a price of V .
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• For i= 1, . . . , n, assign to buyer BMi the item not allocated to BKi for a price of V .
Trades for seller Sλ:
• For i= 1, . . . , n, if xi is true, assign to buyer BMi the items λ
1
i , λ
2
i for a price of 2U , as well as item λ
1
i
to Bλ,1i and λ
2
i to B
λ,2
i for a price of U each.
• For i= 1, . . . , n, if xi is false, assign to buyer BMi the items λ1i , λ2i for a price of 2U , as well as item λ
1
i
to Bλ,1i and λ
2
i to B
λ,2
i for a price of U each.
Further, assign to buyers BMi his remaining required items from sellers S
ψ, paying a price of 1 to each seller
he purchases from. Then, there is a nW -equilibrium which extends these assignments. Similar to the first
part of the proof, a buyer which blocks a bundle Tl for the other buyers corresponds to a truth assignment of
the corresponding variable which results in the clause l to evaluate to false. Since 6 ∃y :¬ϕ(x, y) for the truth
assignment of x, buyers BM and BG can not block all bundles for buyers BK, so each of them can obtain
a bundle which he values at W . There is no coalition of buyers and sellers which want to deviate from this
equilibrium:
• Buyers BG, sellers and Sψ and Sγ,φ can’t form a coalition exclusively among themselves as of Lemma
5.
• For all i= 1, . . . , n, there exists no coalition including buyers BMi in which all participants can be made
better off: Since BMi needs to pay sellers S
χ
i and S
λ more money in order for them to join the coalition,
he needs to pay less to the sellers Sψ he switches to. Those sellers are disjoint from the sellers Sψ he
purchased from earlier. Thus, he can save at most L
2
units from switching which he needs to redistribute
to Sχi and S
λ. However, since buyers Bλ,1i and B
λ,2
i are affected by these trades as well, they need to be
in the coalition as well and purchase items such that Sλ can be made better off (since L
2
< 2D, buyer
Sλ can not deviate only with BMi ). However, since for one of the two buyers, his new payoff is reduced
by L, he will not agree to this coalition unless his payment is also reduced by at least L. However, since
the second of these two buyers can not pay more as he is already capped by his budget, this is not
possible.
• All other buyers and sellers can not deviate from the grand coalition on their own but need at least one
buyer BM in order for all members to achieve a higher payoff. As by the above, there is no coalition
including a buyer BM that can achieve this.
Thus, for a given truth assignment, there is a nW -equilibrium and the proof is complete. Q.E.D.
